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Abstract
We investigate the elasticity of preferences for moral ignorance with respect
to monetary incentives and social norm information. We propose a model
where uncertainty differentially decreases the moral costs of unethical behav-
ior, and benchmark the demand curve for moral ignorance against a morally
neutral context. In line with the model, selfishness is a main determinant of
moral ignorance, and the demand curve for moral ignorance is highly elastic
when information shifts from being costly to incentivized. Moral ignorance is
considered morally inappropriate. Providing this information increases moral
behavior but does not shift the demand curve for ignorance.
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1 Introduction
Information avoidance allows individuals to engage in questionable ethical behav-
ior. Consumers ignore production standards involving child labor or environmental
damage, and even denigrate consumers who seek information in order to identify
more ethical products (Zane et al., 2016). Many art collectors and museum man-
agers ignore the origins of potentially stolen art work.1 Managers avoid information
about potentially unethical behavior taking place at their companies (e.g., Rayner,
2012).2 Also in simple moral dilemmas, individuals avoid costless information about
the consequences on their choices for others, thereby inducing “moral wiggle room”
to act selfishly (e.g., Dana et al., 2007; van der Weele, 2014; Bartling et al., 2014;
Grossman, 2014; Grossman and van der Weele, 2017; Freddi, 2017; Golman et al.,
2017, for a review).
Due to the societal costs of moral ignorance, understanding the nature of pref-
erences for moral ignorance is important. In this paper we study the elasticity of
moral ignorance. We first examine the elasticity of moral ignorance with respect to
the monetary cost to acquire or avoid information, and for the first time benchmark
it against a morally neutral context. Our results show that the demand curve for
information exhibits a sharp kink when moving from small monetary costs to small
incentives to acquire information about an uncertain moral dilemma. Hence, igno-
rance can be reduced by more than 50 percent at a small cost. We next examine
a completely costless approach, based on the idea of “moral reminders” (OECD,
2018), that uses social norms to manipulate the moral costs of ignorance. Most
subjects consider moral ignorance and selfishness morally inappropriate. However,
while norm information decreases the likelihood of selfish acts, it has little impact
on the demand for moral ignorance. Our results suggest that norm provision not
only increases how much people care about a morally relevant situation, but also
how bad some feel if they decide to act selfishly nevertheless. These findings suggest
that preferences for moral ignorance exhibit unique properties that are distinct from
other moral behaviors.
1For example, “The World Jewish Congress (WJC), a New York-based advocacy group, has
criticized museums for waiting for artworks to be claimed by Holocaust victims instead of publicly
announcing that they have suspect items” (Source: CNN.com, March 2, 2000).
2For example, Martin Winterkorn, former CEO of Volkswagen AG, argued that he would have
stopped the emissions scandal if only he had known about it earlier. Yet investigations suggest that
Winterkorn could have known already in 2007 (Source: USA Today, Jan. 19, 2017). In general, in
large organizations, a manager’s ability to know about other individual’s ethical behavior may be
conveniently limited (Jackall, 1988; Dana, 2006).
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To study preferences for moral ignorance, we develop a new experimental paradigm,
the “envelope game”. In this game, an individual chooses between an envelope that
may contain a donation or nothing and a certain, private payment. We measure
demand for information, by allowing the individual to learn (or avoid learning)
the envelope’s content before choosing between the envelope and the selfish option.
Opening the envelope or leaving it closed is monetarily incentivized.
A rich literature documents that individuals often seek excuses to avoid char-
itable giving and other prosocial behaviors. They avoid the charitable ask (e.g.,
DellaVigna et al, 2012; Andreoni et al., 2017; Exley and Petrie, 2018), and use risk
(Exley, 2015) or employ information about poor charity performance (Exley, 2017)
as excuses not to donate. Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that individuals
ignore information about charity performance and put forward scandals surround-
ing the high administrative costs and executive salaries of some charities as excuses
not to give at all.3,4 Yet, recent surveys by Golman et al., (2017) and Hertwig and
Engel (2016) demonstrate that ignorance does not only occur in morally relevant
situations, but in a variety of contexts, such as health (Oster et al., 2013; Ganguly
and Tasoff, 2016), portfolio investment decisions (Karlsson et al., 2009; Sicherman
et al., 2016), or work situations (Huck et al., 2018). Therefore, in this paper we dis-
entangle how much ignorance is driven by the moral relevance of a situation, above
and beyond other, morally neutral aspects.
Traditional models of altruism predict that individuals should not forego money
in order to remain ignorant when the envelope contains a potential donation, as
rejecting a charitable donation is not assumed to induce any moral costs. Yet, recent
evidence has shown that individuals often exhibit costs from rejecting a donation
opportunity (DellaVigna et al., 2012; Andreoni et al. 2017). We propose that such
moral costs are stronger when an individual rejects a certain donation, compared to
an uncertain one (Exley, 2015). Individuals who prefer the private payment to the
donation hence suffer moral costs from rejecting the latter and are willing to pay
in order to leave the envelope closed and remain ignorant. By contrast, individuals
who prefer the donation to the private payment pay in order to open the envelope
and thus acquire information. Therefore, an individual’s valuation of the donation
3“Charities have brought skepticism on themselves in some cases by spending large percentages
of donated funds on administrative costs and executive salaries. But this complaint is so commonly
expressed now that it’s starting to sound like a dodge for not giving rather than a principled
response to bad management at charities.” (Source: The Globe and Mail.com, December 5, 2017).
4Related to these findings, Niehaus (2014) develops a model to explain why individuals may
choose to avoid learning about the impact of their donations.
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opportunity is a central determinant of the price elasticity of moral ignorance.
We find that demand for morally neutral information is significantly stronger
than for morally relevant information. In line with our model, individuals who
prefer the selfish option to the donation decide to stay morally ignorant if the cost
of information is zero. About half of these individuals forego large monetary amounts
to stay ignorant, while the other half prefers ignorance only if it is costless. Thus,
moral costs of rejecting the donation vary across subjects. Moreover, and also
consistent with the model, individuals who prefer the donation to the selfish option
exhibit significant willingness to pay for information. Yet again, we see substantial
heterogeneity. While some subjects are willing to give up significant amounts of
money to acquire information, others only prefer information if it is costless. Overall,
moving from small monetary costs to small monetary incentives for information
reduces moral ignorance by more than 50 percent. We thus observe a pronounced
kink around zero costs of information. This kink is significantly less pronounced in
the morally neutral treatments.
Existing research on social norms in economics and psychology has shown that
information on norms can often increase prosocial behavior (e.g., Cialdini and Gold-
stein, 2004; Schultz et al., 2007; Frey and Meier, 2004; Shang and Croson, 2009;
Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009). Therefore, in a second study, we investigate whether
social norm information is a powerful moral “nudge” to curb moral ignorance. We
first elicit social, injunctive norms regarding information demand in the morally
relevant envelope game (following Krupka and Weber, 2013). Avoiding information
about the donation opportunity and acting selfishly is widely considered morally in-
appropriate, while obtaining information is widely considered morally appropriate.
Remarkably, these norms are rather inelastic to monetary incentives for seeking or
avoiding information. The exception is the presence of a kink in norms regarding
information demand when information becomes costly, which is in line with the kink
in information demand we document in our first experiment.
Through the lens of our model, social norm information could increase individuals’
willingness to donate and thereby raise information demand. Indeed, the data show
that subjects’ valuations of the donation increase from norm provision. However,
the demand curve for information does not shift in response to social norms. We
observe that information demand only increases directionally when individuals need
to pay for information, consistent with positive effects on comparatively altruistic
subjects. By contrast, there is a directional decrease when subjects need to pay to
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avoid information. The latter suggests that moral costs of rejecting the donation
increase as well, thereby making information less appealing for selfish subjects.
Thus far, little is known about the external validity of experiments measuring
information avoidance in moral dilemmas. To address this question, we designed
an additional experiment that elicited demand for information regarding animal
welfare.5 Though consumers often buy products from industrial livestock produc-
tion, few agree with the living conditions of the animals involved (te Velde et al.,
2002; ASPCA 2016; BMEL 2016) and often avoid information about it (Onwezen
and van der Weele, 2016). Approximately a week after our experiments, we invited
individuals to participate in an unrelated study. In this experiment, we rewarded in-
dividuals for correctly answering questions regarding industrial livestock production
and offered the opportunity to watch an informative video beforehand. The results
indicate that the external validity of the envelope game is high. Individuals who
avoid morally relevant information in the envelope game are significantly more likely
to avoid information about the conditions of animals involved in intensive farming.
Information avoidance has been widely studied within the moral wiggle room
paradigm, in which an individual is unsure whether choosing the option yielding a
higher monetary payment for herself hurts or helps another individual. Dana et al.
(2007) were the first to show that individuals avoid costless information about the
consequences of their choices, and are more likely to act selfishly when doing so (see
also, Larson and Capra, 2009; Matthey and Regner, 2011; Feiler, 2014). Ignorance
persists when it costs 0.1 Euro (Grossman and van der Weele, 2017) but drops
substantially when it costs $1 (Cain and Dana, 2012). In contrast to our envelope
game, ignorance is considered morally appropriate, which is why norm information
is an unlikely mean to reduce ignorance in that context (Krupka and Weber, 2013).
We provide four new, main contributions. First, we measure the price elastic-
ity of information demand, with a broad range of prices making ignorance highly
costly up to highly incentivized. We thus measure individual-level willingness to
obtain and avoid information depending on monetary costs and benefits. Second,
we benchmark preferences to avoid morally relevant information with demand for
morally neutral information. Thereby, we identify how much information avoidance
is caused by the moral dimension of decision-making, above and beyond other rea-
sons for why individuals may prefer to stay ignorant. Third, we study information
avoidance in a charitable giving setting, in which choosing the selfish option implies
5We follow Bandura (2016) in that avoiding unnecessary harm to humans, animals, and/or
nature is of moral relevance.
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that no (considerably larger) donation is made. In this setting, ignorance is widely
assessed as morally inappropriate, and hence injunctive social norm information can
be evaluated as a meaningful tool to decrease ignorance. Fourth, we show that
preferences for information avoidance as measured in experimental tasks such as
the envelope game are predictive of information avoidance in other morally relevant
settings. Overall, we provide novel evidence on the elasticity of (moral) ignorance
and its prevalence across different moral contexts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We next describe the setting
in which information demand is studied and provide a brief theoretical background.
Section 3 describes the design of the two main experiments and the additional exper-
iment to measure external validity. Section 4 provides the results of the experiments
and Section 5 discusses their external validity. Section 6 concludes.
2 Avoiding Morally Relevant Information
2.1 The Envelope Game
We study information avoidance in the following game. An individual is assigned
an envelope that contains a $10 donation to the Malaria Consortium, a non-profit
organization fighting Malaria in sub-Saharan Africa, with p = 0.5. Otherwise (thus
also with p = 0.5), the envelope is empty. The individual makes two decisions. First,
she chooses whether or not to open the envelope. If she does not open the envelope,
she chooses between receiving $2.5 for herself and the uncertain envelope. If she
opens the envelope, she first learns whether the envelope contains the $10 donation
or is empty. Then, she chooses between the envelope and receiving $2.5 for herself.
2.2 Theoretical Background
In the following, we solve the envelope game. We start with the case when opening
or leaving the envelope closed is costless, then we turn to the case with payments for
opening the envelope or payments for keeping it closed. We also provide predictions
on how norm provision may influence the decision to open the envelope. We refer to
choosing to take the private payment instead of the envelope as choosing the “selfish
option”, and choosing the envelope as “donating.”
We assume that utility takes the form of u(x) = xr with risk parameter r > 0. As
we will see, the predictions will be independent of the risk parameter. Yet they hinge
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on how much the agent values the donation of 10, i.e., on her monetary equivalent,
which we denote by α · 10. Information demand also depends on whether there is a
moral cost associated with rejecting the certain donation of 10 or not. The standard
economic approach would be to assume that this cost is zero. Then, leaving the
envelope closed never dominates. However, existing theoretical and experimental
work has shown that rejecting a certain donation can induce guilt (e.g., DellaVigna
et al., 2012, Andreoni et al., 2017). We model this moral cost as a discount factor
β of the 2.5 payment that individuals can take for themselves. An individual who
rejects the certain donation gets β · 2.5 with β < 1. In this model, β represents
the additional cost of rejecting a donation when it is certain, relative to when it is
uncertain. As we show, this cost can make it dominant for individuals to pay to
keep uncertainty about the donation.
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Figure 1: Game tree of the envelope game, when information is costless
We solve the game by backwards induction, using the game tree as depicted in
Figure 1. We begin with the decision to take or donate after an initial decision to
open. In this case, it is strictly optimal to take the selfish amount if u(β · 2.5) >
u(α · 10). This is equivalent to α < β · 1
4
, due to the monotonicity of u. At the
other endnode, after an initial decision not to open, it is optimal to take the selfish
monetary amount if u(2.5) > 1
2
·u(α ·10). By our assumption that u(x) = xr, r > 0,




. We can thus turn to the initial decision to open the
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u(α · 10) if α ≥ β · 1
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The utility from not opening is












As β < 1 < 2
1
r , we thus distinguish three cases depending on the location of α. If α
lies below both thresholds, α < β
4
, donating is suboptimal regardless of the decision
in the first stage. In this case, the comparison
1
2
· u(2.5) + 1
2
u(β · 2.5) < u(2.5) (1)
implies that leaving the envelope closed is optimal.7 In the intermediate case when
β · 1
4
≤ α < 2 1r · 1
4





and u(2.5) from leaving the envelope closed. Opening is thus optimal for α ≥ 1
4
. In
the third case α ≥ 2 1r · 1
4







· u(α · 10). In this case, opening the envelope is optimal.
In sum, opening the envelope is optimal for α ≥ 1
4
while keeping it closed is
optimal for α < 1
4
. Hence, we obtain that an agent with a monetary equivalent for
the donation that is not too high prefers to leave the envelope closed.
Let us now consider the case where there are monetary incentives mo in case the
agent opens and mc in case the agent keeps the envelope closed, as shown in the
game tree in Figure 2. For simplicity, we focus on the case r = 1.8 The behavior
6Here and in the following, we assume that an agent who is indifferent between taking the money
and donating will donate. Similarly, the agent favors options with a higher donation probability
in case of indifference.
7In the boundary case β = 1, the agent is instead indifferent between opening and not opening.
8In the appendix, we also address cases of risk aversion and of risk lovingness.
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at the endnodes is not affected by the additional costs of opening or leaving the
envelope closed. After opening and finding a full envelope, the agent donates if
α ≥ β
4













u(α · 10 +mo)
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Figure 2: Game tree of the envelope game, when information acquisition or avoid-
ance is monetarily incentivized
For the initial opening decision, we distinguish again three cases, depending on
whether α < β
4




), or α ≥ 1
2
. First, for α < β
4
, the relevant comparison is
now between a utility of 1+β
2
2.5 + mo from opening and 2.5 + mc from keeping it
closed. Opening is strictly dominant if the difference between mo and mc is positive
and sufficiently large,












), the comparison is between a utility of 2.5+α·10
2
+ mo from
opening and 2.5 +mc from keeping the envelope closed. Opening strictly dominates
if







Otherwise, it is best to leave the envelope closed. Observe that the right hand side
of (2) switches signs at α = 1
4
. Thus, if α < 1
4
, a positive value of mo−mc is needed
to motivate the agent to open the envelope. In contrast, for α > 1
4
, the agent will
still open the envelope in case where mc is slightly larger than mo.
In the third case α ≥ 1
2
, i.e., for subjects with a very high valuation for the
donation, we have to compare 2.5+α·10
2





the envelope closed. Opening strictly dominates if




i.e., unless mc is quite high it is best to open the envelope.
To summarize the three cases, if mo−mc ≤ −54 , it is optimal to keep the envelope







, it is optimal to open the envelope
regardless of α. In the intermediate case
−5
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there exists a threshold value of αt ∈ (β4 ,
1
2
) such that opening is optimal for α ≥ αt











In the experiments, mo − mc ranges from -$2 to $2. Figure 3 depicts optimal
information demand and donation behavior depending on monetary incentives and
levels of altruism, α, for three cases of moral costs. As we see, in most cases, it
is the level of altruism α, that determines whether individuals open the envelope
or leave it closed (see the transition from the green to the yellow area). If moral
discounting via β is small, selfish individuals may open the envelope and bear the
moral costs when taking the selfish option if monetary incentives for opening are
pronounced (blue area). Moreover, if monetary incentives to leave the envelope
closed are sizable, altruistists may leave the envelope closed and donate the closed
envelope (red area).
In addition to the impact of monetary incentives, we study empirically the causal
effects of providing information about moral norms. We investigate two types of
norms in the envelope game. We either inform agents that getting information is
considered morally appropriate by a vast majority of agents, or we inform them that
leaving the envelope closed and getting the selfish monetary amount is considered
morally inappropriate. In terms of our model, this could lead to an increase in the
monetary equivalent of the donation, i.e., to an increase in α. Such an increase
could lead to more demand for information in the envelope game (unless α becomes
very large), and thereby, curb moral ignorance. However, there may be a partly
opposing effect. The moral costs of rejecting a certain donation could increase from
10







































Figure 3: Optimal decisions for a risk neutral individual with β = 0.36, 0.66, 0.96,
respectively
norm provision, i.e., the moral discounting via β could become more intense. A
decrease in β would reduce the demand for information when incentives to obtain
information are positive. In contrast, it would have no impact when individuals pay
to open the envelope (mo = 0 and mc > 0). Therefore, all in all, we expected that
norm provision would have a positive impact on information seeking.
3 Experimental Design
In the following, we present the designs of two experiments that examine the im-
pact of incentives (Experiment 1) and social norms (Experiment 2) on information
avoidance. In total, we analyze the decisions of 1304 participants. The design of the
two experiments is summarized in Table 1. The experiments were pre-registered.9
3.1 Experiment 1
In this experiment we study the effect of incentives on preferences for information
in the envelope game. In the main treatment, which we refer to as the Donation
treatment, the envelope contained a $10 donation with a 50% chance. We varied
the payment for opening the envelope, from -$2 to $2. Specifically, individuals made
nine independent decisions, with the following range of payments for opening the
9Pre-registration was done on aspredicted.org.
11
envelope: $2, $1, $0.50, $0.10, $0, -$0.10, -$0.50, -$1 and -$2.10
The main hypothesis in this experiment was that individuals would strongly pre-
fer und thus pay for information avoidance. As we discussed theoretically above,
information avoidance is attractive if subjects prefer taking $2.50 over making a
$10 donation. We expected this to be the case for most subjects. However, if sub-
jects value the $10 donation more over taking $2.50, they should prefer to open the
envelope.
To benchmark preferences to avoid morally relevant information against prefer-
ences to avoid (or seek) information in a morally neutral decision, we ran two control
treatments (Self treatments). In these, the uncertain donation was replaced by an
uncertain payment for subjects themselves.
Thus, in the Self treatments, the set-up was similar to the Donation treatment,
with the only difference that the envelope contained money for the individual instead
of a donation. The envelope contained nothing or a payment for the individual ($5
in the Self-5 treatment, $10 in the Self-10 treatment). Again, the likelihood that the
envelope contained money was p = 0.5. As in the Donation treatment, individuals
chose between the envelope and a $2.50 payment. They could open the envelope
beforehand, with the same range of prices for opening as in the Donation treatment.
In these treatments, there is no moral reason for subjects to pay money in order to
leave the envelope closed.11
3.2 Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, run two months after Experiment 1, we study norms regarding
information avoidance. A large number of studies have shown that social norms af-
fect individuals’ behavior in an array of contexts (e.g., Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004;
Schultz et al., 2007). In the context of donation behavior, descriptive norm informa-
tion, which informs about others’ behavior, increases charitable giving (McAuliffe et
al. 2017, Shang and Croson 2009; Martin and Randal, 2008). Injunctive norm infor-
mation, which describes how individuals should behave, can also increase prosocial
10Individuals knew that whether the envelope contained the donation or not independently varied
across all nine decisions. To simplify elicitation, decisions were made one at a time, on separate
screens, and the order of the questions always followed the same descending pattern of payments
for opening the envelope. The instructions are presented in Appendix A.
11Standard theory would predict that subjects open the envelope unless opening becomes suffi-
ciently costly. Yet, some individuals may nevertheless prefer to leave the envelope closed if they
have a preference to maintain uncertainty, as has been found in financial decision-making (e.g.
Karlsson et al., 2009).
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Table 1: Experimental Design
Experiment Treatments Description
1 Donation Donation uncertainty: $10 donation with p = 0.5, $0 otherwise
Self-5 Payment uncertainty: $5 payment with p = 0.5, $0 otherwise
Self-10 Payment uncertainty: $10 payment with p = 0.5, $0 otherwise
2 Norms Elicitation of social norms regarding information demand
NoNorm Donation treatment without norm information
Norm-Avoid Donation treatment, informing avoidance is morally inappropriate
Norm-Seek Donation treatment, seeking information is morally appropriate
behavior (e.g., Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009; Hallsworth et al., 2017).
In our context, given the widespread avoidance of information in Experiment 1,
informing other subjects about this behavior using descriptive social norms would
unlikely curb ignorance. Thus, there is little scope for providing (truthful) descrip-
tive information as a means to decrease ignorance. By contrast, if most individuals
evaluate ignorance as morally inappropriate, injunctive norm provision could poten-
tially increase information demand.
Little is known about the perceived morality of information avoidance, and whether
providing information about its moral inappropriateness can reduce it. Philosophers
have proposed the “Ignorance Thesis”, which states that, if an individual chooses
to remain ignorant in a moral decision, she is culpable for acts that derive from it
(Zimmerman, 1997; Rosen, 2003; Guerrero, 2007). If individuals broadly agree with
this view, we should find injunctive norms in favor of informational demand.
Yet, Krupka and Weber (2013) elicit norms in the standard moral wiggle room
game in Dana et al. (2007), and find that information avoidance is considered
morally appropriate. We expected that in our context, a majority of subjects would
consider information avoidance morally inappropriate, because the only way to re-
move the moral relevance of the decision is to open the envelope and find that it is
empty. Reassuringly, this is what we find.
We first ran a treatment to elicit the perceived morality of information avoid-
ance and donation decisions. Using the method proposed by Krupka and Weber
(2013), we elicited the moral appropriateness of decisions in the Donation treat-
ment in Experiment 1. Subjects rated the options on a four-point Likert scale. The
four categories were “very morally appropriate”, “somewhat morally appropriate”,
“somewhat morally inappropriate”, and “very morally inappropriate”. Subjects’
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ratings were elicited for each of the nine information decisions, i.e., for each cost
of information (avoidance). As in Krupka and Weber (2013), subjects were incen-
tivized to correctly estimate the rating that most subjects would provide. They
earned $5 if their rating in a randomly drawn decision coincided with the favorite
answer of the other participants in that treatment, and zero otherwise.
After eliciting injunctive norms, we provided them to other subjects. Specifically,
we randomly allocated a new set of participants to one of three treatments. The
first treatment was a NoNorm treatment, which was the same as the Donation
treatment in Study 1. The second was a Norm-Avoid treatment, in which individuals
were informed that over 70% of individuals considered it morally inappropriate to
take the $2.50 payment, without seeking information about the envelope’s content
first. The third treatment was a Norm-Seek treatment, in which individuals were
told that over 70% of individuals considered seeking information, by opening the
envelope first, morally appropriate.12 For robustness, we tested both positively and
negatively framed norm information. Each message was shown once, just before
individuals started making their information decisions. As we will show, ratings
of moral appropriateness did not vary strongly with the cost of avoidance, which
allowed us to provide a single general message before individuals made decisions.
Our main hypotheses were that providing information about the moral inappro-
priateness of avoiding information and choosing not to donate (Norm-Avoid), or
the moral appropriateness of information seeking (Norm-Seek) would decrease in-
formation avoidance compared to the NoNorm treatment, respectively. We also
hypothesized that subject’s valuations for the donation would increase from norm
provision. In fact, this is the mechanism in our model for why subjects should
display more interest in getting information in the Norms treatments.13
3.3 Follow-Up: External Validity of Information Preferences
An important question when measuring information avoidance in an experimental
task is whether such behavior is externally valid in another incentivized, different
setting. For example, recent work has shown that individuals avoid morally relevant
12The exact message shown to participants was “over 70% of MTurkers who evaluated the actions
in this part of the study consider it morally inappropriate (appropriate) to choose the option “Get
$2.5” without revealing what the envelope contains first (“Reveal what the envelope contains”
first).”
13As pointed out in the theoretical framework section, there may be a (partly) opposing effect if
norm provision also increases the moral costs of rejecting a certain donation. Yet as the analysis
shows, this could only foster a desire for ignorance if obtaining information is costly.
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information about the refugee crisis in Swedish media (Freddi, 2017). There is,
however, no evidence to our knowledge about the predictive validity of experimental
measures of information avoidance in a different, real setting. To test the predictive
power of the elicited informational preferences, we measured information avoidance
in an unrelated, later morally relevant task.
We invited participants of our studies to an unrelated work task between 7 and
10 days after they had participated in the experiments described above. The task
consisted in answering questions about the living conditions of cows and their calves
in conventional dairy production. We chose this topic because the willingness to
improve living conditions of farm animals correlates with a higher moral and pro-
social inclination (Albrecht et al., 2017). Even though many consumers buy products
from intense animal farming, many state that they do not agree with the living
conditions of animals involved (te Velde et al., 2002). Therefore, if individuals want
to continue their consumption of conventional dairy products, they may have an
incentive to avoid information about cows’ living conditions.
Participants earned a $0.15 bonus if they answered two questions about the treat-
ment of cows and their calves in conventional farming correctly. Before proceeding
to the questions, they were offered the option to watch a 1-minute informational
video. We study how frequently individuals choose to watch the video as a mea-
sure of information avoidance in another morally relevant and incentivized setting.
The main question is whether individuals who choose to avoid information in the
envelope game also avoid watching the video.
3.4 Experimental Procedures
3.4.1 Other Determinants of Information Avoidance
In all experiments, subject first played the envelope game. Thereafter, we elicited
several control measures of individuals’ preferences.
As we saw in the Theoretical Background section, a subject’s valuation of the
donation (α) is particularly relevant for her decision whether or not to avoid infor-
mation. To measure this valuation, subjects participated in two tasks that elicited
their preferences for the opened as well as for the closed envelope. First, we elicited
the monetary equivalent of a certain $10 donation, by asking the individual to make
eight binary choices between the donation and payments to her that increased from
$0.10 to $10. Second, we elicited the monetary equivalent of a $10 donation that
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occurs with a 50% chance. In this task, individuals made again eight binary choices,
each between the potential donation and a payment that increased from $0.01 to
$5.14 For each individual, we calculate her monetary equivalent of a certain (uncer-
tain) donation as the maximum value of the payment to her that she was willing to
give up instead of the donation.
At the end, in a questionnaire, we elicited preferences for information (avoidance)
according to the Monitors-Blunters Scale (Miller, 1987), moral preferences accord-
ing the Machiavellianism scale (Christie and Geis, 1970), as well as gender, age,
education and frequency of work in Mturk.
Existing research in psychology has developed scales to measure preferences for
information avoidance and attachment to social norms. The Monitors-Blunters Scale
(Miller, 1987) is a well-established scale that measures information-seeking behav-
iors under threat. Individuals who prefer information before a stressful event are
considered monitors, while those who avoid information are considered blunters. A
higher score on the scale implies more monitoring. We test whether subjects who
express more desire for information in the Monitors-Blunters Scale less likely avoid
information in the Donation treatment.
The Machiavellianism Score measures whether an individual considers herself as
attached or detached from moral and social norms (Christie and Geis, 1970). A sub-
ject classified as more machiavellian according to the Machiavellianism Scale may
feel lower moral costs from rejecting a donation. Therefore, we test whether individ-
uals classified as more machiavellian have a lower willingness to avoid information
in the Donation treatment compared to other subjects.
In the Self treatments we also elicited a control measure of subjects’ risk pref-
erence. After subjects had completed the envelope game, we elicited their risk
preferences and used the same questionnaires described above. Since in this treat-
ment there was no mention of a donation opportunity, we did not measure subjects’
valuation of the $10 donation to fight malaria. We provide detailed information on
these measures and descriptive statistics in Appendix B.
3.4.2 Sample
There were 593 subjects in Experiment 1, dropping inconsistent subjects as pre-
registered. Of these, 294 participated in the main treatment, the Donation treat-
14Subjects knew that the computer either drew one of these two tasks or the main part of the
experiment for payment, and that exactly one of the decisions taken in these would accordingly
become implemented.
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ment, 147 in Self-5 and 152 in Self-10. In Experiment 2, we first conducted the
Norms treatment, with 102 participants. We thereafter conducted the treatments
NoNorm, Norm-Avoid and Norm-Seek at the same time and randomly assigned sub-
jects to one of these three treatments. There are 200, 201 and 208 subjects in each
treatment, respectively. These sample sizes were chosen to be able to detect a $0.15
change in willingness to pay for information in the presence of social norm infor-
mation (with an 80% power). Throughout, we exclude individuals who answered
inconsistently as pre-registered.
Since Experiment 2 was conducted two months after Experiment 1, we again
elicited the behavior of individuals in the Donation treatment, labeled NoNorm
treatment here, to control for any differences in the sample.15 We find that, in
contrast to Experiment 1, the share of female participants in Experiment 2 was
significantly higher, 53.0%, compared to 45.2% in Experiment 1 (t-test, p-value
< 0.01).16 In line with previous literature on gender effects in altruistic behavior
(e.g., Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001), we observe a higher monetary equivalent of
the certain $10 donation in this experiment, $2.9, compared to Experiment 1, $1.9
(t-test, p-value < 0.01). We also observe a weaker preference to avoid information in
the NoNorm treatment than in the Donation treatment in Experiment 1 (t-test, p-
value < 0.01), consistent with our prediction (and finding) that a higher willingness
to donate is associated with a lower willingness to pay for information avoidance.
The analysis of Experiment 2 hence focuses on the treatment effect of providing
information about social norms within this experiment.
On average, 86.3% of participants in the experiments completed the follow-up
task in which we measure information avoidance about cows’ living conditions, to
externally validate the morally relevant envelope game.17 Since the relationship
between information avoidance in the envelope game and the follow-up task is qual-
itatively similar in the Donation treatment in Experiment 1 and in Experiment 2,
we focus our analysis on Experiment 2, where we can also examine whether social
15We conducted a first smaller version of Experiment 2 that suggested that results would be
incomparable to the former Donation treatment run two months earlier. We hence conducted a
larger study thereafter, and focus on this data. Including the smaller study does not change the
conclusions.
16Age, educational attainment and MTurk experience of participants did not differ (t-tests, p-
value > 0.05).
17The return rate is 83.7% in the Donation treatment in Experiment 1, 91% in the Donation
(-NoNorm) in Experiment 2, and 87.6% and 84% in the Norm-Avoid and Norm-Seek treatments,
respectively. Within Experiment 2, the difference in return rates between the Norm-Seek and
NoNorm treatments is significant (p-value = 0.036).
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norms information had a long-run effect on information avoidance.
4 Results
4.1 Experiment 1: Information Avoidance and Incentives
Figure 4 displays the share of individuals who demand information, that is, open
the envelope, for each price of information, by treatment. The bottom black line
depicts information demand in the Donation treatment. We observe that 31% of
individuals demand information when the cost of information is zero. This implies
that the majority, i.e., 69% of individuals, avoid information when it is costless.
Among these information avoiders, 65% are willing to pay at least 10 cents, and
57% are willing to pay more than 50 cents for moral ignorance. Further, 44% of
them are willing to pay at least $1, and 22% are willing to pay $2 for ignorance.
This illustrates that, on one hand, a small monetary cost reduces moral ignorance
significantly, by 35 percent. On the other hand, for a substantial proportion of
subjects, preferences for moral ignorance are strong. On average, across all subjects
in the Donation treatment, individuals pay 40 cent in order to stay morally ignorant.
This is significantly different from $0 (t-test, p-value < 0.01). This suggests that
the moral cost of rejecting the certain donation is substantial.
Individuals who choose to avoid information pick the selfish payment for them-
selves in a large majority of cases (88.4%, on average). Individuals who choose to
obtain information tend to have a larger interest in giving. The share of individuals
who donate when they learn that there is a $10 donation in the envelope increases
from 49% to 100%, as the price of information increases. This is consistent with
selection. In line with the theoretical framework, subjects with a higher valuation
for the donation are more willing to pay for information acquisition, and then opt
for the donation if the envelope contains it.18
In the Self treatments, in contrast, we observe that individuals are on average
willing to pay for information acquisition. The average willingness to pay for infor-
mation in the Self-10 treatment is $0.83, and $0.29 in the Self-5 treatment. In both
cases, this is significantly different from zero (t-test, p < 0.01). The willingness to
obtain information in the Self-10 is higher than in the Self-5 treatment (p < 0.01),
in line with standard comparative statics of information preferences.
18Detailed information on the distribution of information choices by price of information, as well
as behavior conditional on obtaining information, is provided in Appendix C.
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Figure 4: Information Avoidance, by treatment
The Self-5 and Self-10 provide a benchmark for information demand in a morally
neutral companion context, relative to the morally relevant context in the Donation
treatment. Assuming linearity, we find that willingness to pay to avoid information
in the Donation treatment is equivalent to willingness to pay to obtain information
when the envelope contains ca. $6 for the individual with 50% chance, i.e., a Self-6
treatment.
Overall, preferences for moral ignorance in the Donation treatment when the cost
of information is zero are comparable to those in experiments based on the moral
wiggle room paradigm by Dana et al. (2007). Our morally neutral treatments
indicate that roughly half of ignorance is specific to the moral relevance of the
situation.
The patterns of information demand in the Donation treatment indicate that,
not only is there significant information avoidance, but also that the relationship
between prices and information demand changes when informational choices are
morally relevant. Specifically, in the Donation treatment, we observe a significant
kink in the demand curve around $0. This kink is consistent with suggestive evidence
in Grossman and van der Weele (2017), who find that information demand drops to
zero when there is a 0.10 Euro incentive to avoid information, in a session with 10
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subjects in the moral wiggle room paradigm of Dana et al. (2007).
Figure 4 indicates that the kink around $0 is more pronounced in the Donation
treatment than in the Self treatments. There are also differences in price sensitivity
when information is costless and costly, relative to the Self-5 and $10 treatments. We
conduct an exploratory analysis of these differences in Table 2. This table presents
the results of linear probability models on the decision to demand information, as
a function of the price of information. To account for the kink in the demand
curve around 0, the regression includes an indicator variable for costly information,
i.e., when prices are strictly positive. To allow for the relationship between price
and information demand to vary when information is costly relative to when it is
costless, the regression also includes an interaction term between the indicator for
costly information and the price of information.
The results shown in columns (1)-(3) of Table 2 display the relationship between
price and information demand in the Donation treatment, the Self-5 and the Self-10,
respectively. Column (4) shows that the effect of price is different in the Donation
treatment, compared to the Self treatments, in three ways. First, in the Donation
treatment, we observe a pronounced kink, of 27 percentage points, around $0. This
is significantly different from the Self treatments, in which there is more demand for
information and a smaller kink of 6 percentage points. Second, when individuals are
paid to acquire information, price sensitivity is stronger in the Donation treatment
than in the Self treatments. This is explained by the fact that most subjects always
demand information in the Self treatments, while some subjects exhibit a preference
to avoid information in the Donation treatment. Third, price sensitivity is weaker
in the Donation treatment than in the Self treatments when individuals have to pay
for information. Since only few subjects have a preference to pay for information in
the Donation treatment, it may not be surprising to see a smaller elasticity here.
4.2 The Determinants of Informational Preferences in the
Moral Domain
To better understand information preferences in the Donation treatment, and in
particular the kink around $0, we examine the determinants of informational choices
in more detail. As highlighted in the theoretical framework, an important predictor
of informational preferences in the donation context is the individual’s willingness
to donate. We use the monetary equivalent of the $10 donation elicited in the
experiment to examine its relationship with the choice to avoid information. First,
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Table 2: Demand for Information Across Domains
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Information Demand (Open envelope)
Treatment: Donation Self-5 Self-10 All
Price (of Information) -0.2159*** -0.1124*** -0.0902*** -0.2159***
(0.0130) (0.0170) (0.0154) (0.0130)
Costly Information -0.2751*** -0.0670** -0.0613** -0.2751***
(0.0234) (0.0271) (0.0242) (0.0234)
Costly Information X Price 0.1581*** -0.1499*** -0.1036*** 0.1581***





Price X Self-5 0.1035***
(0.0213)
Price X Self-10 0.1257***
(0.0202)
Costly Information X Self-5 0.2081***
(0.0358)
Costly Information X Self-10 0.2138***
(0.0337)
Costly Information X Price X Self-5 -0.3081***
(0.0392)
Costly Information X Price X Self-10 -0.2617***
(0.0356)
Constant 0.4452*** 0.6823*** 0.7851*** 0.4452***
(0.0266) (0.0387) (0.0322) (0.0266)
Observations 2,646 1,323 1,368 5,337
R-squared 0.3117 0.2301 0.1641 0.3166
Nr. of subjects 294 147 152 593
Notes: This table examines the impact of price on information demand in the Donation, Self-10
and Self-5 treatments. The dependent variable takes value 1 if the individual demands information
(opens envelope). Robust clustered standard errors shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
we find that there is a significantly negative relationship between an individual’s
monetary equivalent of the $10 donation (willingness to donate, or WTD) and her
willingness to pay for information, as shown in Figure 5a. The Spearman correlation
coefficient is -0.39 (p-value<0.01). Thus, in line with the model, it is individuals
with a low willingness to donate who tend to pay for moral ignorance.
To better understand the kink around $0, we first explore whether the kink is
driven by a specific subgroup of people within our population, or whether it is a
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(a) Willingness to Pay for Information and Donation Valuation
(b) Demand for Information by Donation Valuation
Figure 5: Information Preferences and Donation Preferences
broad phenomenon. We classify our population into five subgroups, depending on
their monetary valuation of the donation. Figure 5b shows the information demand
curve for each subgroup. The darker curves indicate lower monetary valuations for
the donation, while the lighter curves indicate higher valuations. A kink of at least
20 percentage points around $0 is observed for all subgroups.
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Why is the kink around $0 observed? In line with the theoretical framework,
subjects who value the $10 donation less than the selfish option (WTD<2.5), exhibit
a kink to the left of $0. If the price of information is $0 or higher, these individuals
predominantly choose not to obtain information. This kink before $0 suggests that, a
seizable share of individuals has a small moral cost of rejecting the certain donation.
They only avoid information when avoidance is costless. In terms of the model, their
β is slightly below 1. At the same time, as the price of information increases from -$2
to -$0.10, information demand decreases, revealing that there is a significant fraction
of individuals who avoids information at a larger cost, suggestive of heterogeneity
in β.
Individuals who value the $10 donation more than the selfish option (WTD≥2.5)
exhibit a kink to the right of $0. On average, 72% of individuals with WTD≥2.5
obtain information when it is free, but this fraction drops by 23 percentage points
when information costs $0.10. Since these individuals value the donation between
$2.5 and $10, we first examine whether their behavior is similar to that of individuals
in the Self-10 and Self-5 treatments. Subjects with a WTD of 10 should behave as in
Self-10, and subjects with a WTD of 5 should act like subjects in Self-5. Comparing
those subjects who display a WTD of 10 (N=26) in the Donation treatment and
subjects in the Self-10 treatment, we do not find a difference on willingness to pay for
information, which is $0.83 in both cases (p-value=0.9773). The number of subjects
with a WTD of 5 in the Donation treatment is small (N=8), and hence such a
comparison cannot be made. Yet, the behavior of subjects with a WTD between
2.5 and 7.5 shown in Figure 5b displays a significant kink in information demand to
the right of $0, which is not observed in the Self-5 (or Self-10) treatments.
This kink could be explained for two reasons. The first is risk preferences in
the donation domain. If individuals are sufficiently risk seeking, when information
becomes costless, they could prefer to choose the envelope without information.
Indeed, about a third of the subjects (31.4%) who do not demand information when
it is costly, opt for the closed envelope instead.19
The second reason for the kink is that moral norms regarding information seeking
19Among the selected sample of individuals who no longer demand information when it costs
$0.10, we find that 30 individuals choose the $2.5 payment, while 9 choose the closed envelope.
To examine whether those subjects who switch to the closed envelope are relatively risk loving
with respect to the donation, we explore the ratio of their valuation of the donation with certainty,
relative to their valuation of the donation with uncertainty. A risk neutral individual would exhibit
a ratio of 2. We find that on average the ratio for all subjects is 2.33 (s.d. 2.78). For the subjects
who switched it is 1.74 (s.d. 0.66). Thus, indeed, we find some indication of risk lovingness in
these subjects.
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may differ from those regarding information avoidance. Though this is not captured
in our model, when information is costly, choosing not to pay for information may
be considered more morally appropriate than choosing to pay to avoid informa-
tion. In the next section, we collect data on the moral norms regarding information
avoidance. These norms turn out to be rather inelastic to the price of information.
Nevertheless, information demand is considered somewhat less important when in-
formation becomes costly. This norm change may contribute to the kink around $0
for subjects who have a high valuation for the certain donation.
In addition to the individual’s valuation of the $10 donation, several individual
characteristics may explain an individual’s willingness to pay for information. In
Table 3 we examine the determinants of information preferences in the Donation
treatment. One important preference is the individual’s value of a $10 donation
that occurs only with 50% chance. To measure how much the individual’s value
drops when uncertainty cannot be removed, we compare the monetary equivalent
of a $10 donation with certainty and the one with 50% chance. If the equivalent
with uncertainty is less than half of the equivalent with certainty, we classify the
individual as risk averse (with respect to the donation). We do not observe that
the change in the donation valuation when it is uncertain, relative to when it is
certain, is related to information demand. Additional characteristics that can ex-
plain information decisions are the score on the Monitors-Blunters Scale and the
Machiavellianism scale, as well as gender, age, education and frequency of work
on Mturk. We find that the Monitors-Blunters Scale is associated with information
avoidance, but we do not find evidence that the Machiavellianism scale or individual
socio-demographic characteristics explain information choices.
4.3 Experiment 2: Social Norms Regarding Information
Avoidance
Figure 6 displays the fraction of individuals who considers getting the $2.5 payment
morally appropriate, as well as the fraction who considers demanding information
by opening the envelope morally appropriate. An action is defined as morally ap-
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Table 3: Determinants of information demand in the Donation treatment
(1) (2) (3)
Willingnes to pay for information
Monetary equivalent of $10 donation 0.1625*** 0.1653*** 0.1640***
(0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0213)
Risk averse 0.1168 0.0992 0.0942
(0.1485) (0.1482) (0.1496)
Monitors-Blunters Scale Score 0.0273** 0.0277**
(0.0135) (0.0138)






High school degree or higher -0.0744
(0.1188)
Works every day on Mturk 0.0479
(0.2232)
Constant -0.7416*** -0.9966*** -0.9651**
(0.0715) (0.3518) (0.4721)
Observations 294 294 294
R-squared 0.2014 0.2130 0.2147
Notes: This table examines the determinants of willingness to pay for information in
the Donation treatment. The dependent variable takes values from -2 to 2, depending
on when the individual chooses to switch from obtaining information to not obtaining
information. The monetary equivalent of $10 donation is the individual’s valuation of
the donation. Risk averse is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the individual values
a donation opportunity with 50% chance less than half of her monetary equivalent of a
certain donation. Standard errors shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1
propriate if an individual considers it somewhat or very morally appropriate.20,21
On average, less than a third of subjects considers avoiding information and
20Alternatively, we could measure moral appropriateness ratings by giving a rating as very
morally inappropriate a value of -1, a rating as somewhat morally inappropriate a value of -1/3, a
rating as somewhat morally appropriate a value of 1/3 and a rating as very morally appropriate a
value of 1 (see also, Krupka and Weber, 2013). The results are qualitatively similar. Furthermore,
we also elicited the moral appropriateness of choosing the envelope without knowing whether
it contains a donation for certain. A large majority of subjects consider such action morally
appropriate. Detailed results for all actions are presented in Appendix C.
21In the Norms treatment, we also elicited the moral appropriateness of donating versus acting
selfishly. When faced with a certain $10 donation, 78% of individuals consider it morally inappro-
priate not to donate $10 (and forgo $2.5). When faced with a 50% chance of a $10 donation, 66.7%
consider it morally inappropriate not to donate. These results are broadly in line with existing
research evaluating social norms around sharing decisions (e.g., Krupka and Weber, 2013).
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Figure 6: Social Norms regarding Information Avoidance
choosing the $2.50 payment very or somewhat morally appropriate. By contrast,
over 70% of individuals consider seeking information very or somewhat morally
appropriate. Overall, the moral inappropriateness of each action in the envelope
game shows relatively little sensitivity to price. Yet when information is costly, the
moral norm to obtain information is significantly weakened, which may explain why
individuals demand less information in that case. Table 4 presents the results of
a linear probability model on the evaluation of each action as morally appropriate.
Moral appropriateness of demanding information does not vary significantly with
the price of information, but it exhibits a kink around a price of $0. If information
is costly, demanding information is 8 percentage points less likely to be considered
morally appropriate. This result provides an explanation for the kink in information
demand when price increases from $0 to $0.10, documented in Experiment 1.
4.4 Experiment 2: The Impact of Information about Social
Norms
Does the provision of the collected information on social norms reduce moral igno-
rance? Figure 7 depicts the demand curve for information when individuals receive
social norm information and when they do not. Avoidance in the NoNorm treatment
is shown in the black solid line. Avoidance in Norm-Avoid is depicted by the grey
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Table 4: Moral Appropriateness
(1) (2) (3)
Morally Appropriate
Action: Get $2.5 Demand Information All
Price (of Information) 0.0450** 0.0087 0.0087
(0.0181) (0.0140) (0.0140)
Costly Information -0.0257 -0.0827** -0.0827**
(0.0241) (0.0346) (0.0346)




Price X Get $2.5 0.0362
(0.0219)
Costly Information X Get $2.5 0.0570
(0.0458)
Costly Information X Price X Get $2.5 -0.0425
(0.0366)
Constant 0.3108*** 0.9063*** 0.9063***
(0.0440) (0.0233) (0.0233)
Observations 918 918 1,836
R-squared 0.0033 0.0150 0.3564
Nr. of subjects 102 102 102
Notes: This table examines the impact of price on the likelihood that getting $2.5 (private payment)
and demanding information is considered very or somewhat morally appropriate. The dependent
variable takes value 1 if the individual considers getting $2.5 (private payment) or demanding
information very morally appropriate or somewhat morally appropriate. Robust clustered standard
errors shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
dashed line and in Norm-Seek by the grey solid line.
On average, we do not observe a significant effect of social norm information on
moral ignorance. Table 5 presents the results from estimating the effect of norm
information on the likelihood to avoid information. We observe that ignorance
decreases directionally by 1 to 4 percentage points, a change that is not significantly
different from zero.
As observed in Experiment 1, information avoidance again displays a significant
kink around $0 (of 32 percentage points) in the NoNorm treatment. This kink is
similar when information about social norms is provided. The data thus confirm that
a shift from small monetary costs to small monetary rewards for seeking information
can decrease moral ignorance in a pronounced and robust way.
When exploring the effects of social norm information on information demand,
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Figure 7: Information Avoidance in Experiment 2, by treatment
we find that social norm information decreases price sensitivity. The results are
displayed in column (3) of Table 5. First, price sensitivity decreases significantly,
by ca. 5 percentage points, when individuals are paid to obtain information in
both Norms treatments. Descriptively, a higher share of individuals choose not to
obtain information even if they are paid $2 in the Norm-Avoid and Norm-Seek treat-
ments. Second, when individuals have to pay to obtain information, they are also
less price sensitive (significantly so in the Norm-Seek treatment). For this range of
prices, there is a directional upward shift in the demand curve, as individuals de-
mand information more often. This effect is consistent with social norm information
increasing individuals’ valuation of the donation.
To examine whether social norm information affects subjects’ willingness to do-
nate (WTD), we compare the monetary equivalent of a $10 donation across treat-
ments. It increases by $0.71 (t-test, p-value=0.06) and $0.68 (t-test, p-value=0.08) in
the Norm-Avoid and Norm-Seek treatments, respectively, compared to the NoNorm
treatment.22 In terms of our model, we thus observe an increase in the individual’s
22In line with this result, we find that conditional on demanding information, individuals who
learn that the envelope contains a $10 donation donate 67% of the time in the NoNorm treat-
ment, 77% in the Norm-Avoid treatment, and 74% in the Norm-Seek treatment. The increase is
marginally significant (p=0.051 and p=0.063, respectively).
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Table 5: Information Demand in Response to Social Norm Information
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Demand Information (Open envelope)
Treatment NoNorm Norm-Avoid Norm-Seek All
Price (of Information) -0.1922*** -0.1384*** -0.1351*** -0.1922***
(0.0151) (0.0142) (0.0136) (0.0151)
Costly Information -0.3247*** -0.2941*** -0.2853*** -0.3247***
(0.0300) (0.0295) (0.0286) (0.0299)
Costly Information X Price 0.1006*** 0.0616*** 0.0288 0.1006***





Price X Norm-Avoid 0.0538***
(0.0207)
Price X Norm-Seek 0.0570***
(0.0203)
Costly Information X Norm-Avoid 0.0306
(0.0420)
Costly Information X Norm-Seek 0.0394
(0.0414)
Costly Information X Price X Norm-Avoid -0.0390
(0.0331)
Costly Information X Price X Norm-Seek -0.0718**
(0.0340)
Constant 0.5796*** 0.5909*** 0.6238*** 0.5796***
(0.0315) (0.0318) (0.0304) (0.0315)
Observations 1,800 1,809 1,872 5,481
R-squared 0.3460 0.2399 0.2579 0.2814
Nr of subjects 200 201 208 609
Notes: This table examines the impact of price on information demand in the NoNorm, Norm-Avoid
and Norm-Seek treatments. The dependent variable takes value 1 if the individual demands information
(opens envelope). Robust clustered standard errors shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1
WTD (i.e., an increase in α).
In the theoretical framework, we argued that norm provision may operate in two
ways: First, an increase in WTD could lead to more demand for information in the
envelope game. However, there may be a second, partly opposing effect. If moral
costs of rejecting a certain donation increase from norm provision as well, i.e., if the
moral discounting via β becomes more drastic, effects could be partly offset. This
could only reduce the demand for information for rather selfish individuals. Consis-
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tent with this prediction, the directional downward shift in the demand function is
only observed when the price of information is negative. When the price of infor-
mation is positive, only individuals with an interest in donating open the envelope
anyway. Among them, we see a weak increase in demand for information. There-
fore, norm provision only increases information demand directionally when getting
information is costly.
All in all, we find that norm provision increases willingness to donate, but does not
increase information demand on average. It only directionally increases information
demand among rather altruistic subjects.
5 External Validity of Information Preferences in
the Envelope Game
The results thus far reveal that information demand about a moral dilemma, such as
that studied in the envelope game, is highly elastic to price, but rather inelastic to
social norm information. An important question is whether information demand in
the envelope game is predictive of information demand in other moral dilemmas. For
this purpose, we developed a follow-up task on information demand about animal
welfare in dairy production, which ran 7 to 10 days after individuals participated in
the morally relevant envelope game. We found that a majority of participants (65%)
choose to watch the informational video about cows’ living conditions. The main
question is whether the choice to watch this video is related to subjects’ willingness
to pay to avoid information in the envelope game.
Table 6 shows the relationship between willingness to pay to avoid information
in the envelope game and the choice to watch the informational video. As can
be seen, individuals with a stronger willingness to pay to avoid information in our
experimental task are also less likely to watch the video about cows’ living conditions.
This provides evidence in support of the external validity of informational choices
in our main experiment.23
The rate of avoidance varies with social norm information. In the NoNorm treat-
ment, the share of individuals who watch the video is 76.9%. It is 68.8% in the
Norm-Avoid treatment, and 74.3% in the NormReveal treatment. As shown in col-
umn (2) of Table 4, the Norm-Avoid treatment led to an increase in avoidance of
23Qualitatively similar results are obtained if we study the relationship between the share of
correct answers to the questions about the video and information avoidance in the donation setting.
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Table 6: External validity of informational preferences
Likelihood of watching
video about cows’ living
conditions
(1) (2)






Norm-Seek X Willingness to pay to avoid information 0.0094
(0.0403)
Norm-Seek X Willingness to pay to avoid information -0.0126
(0.0424)
Observations 533 533
Notes: This table reports marginal effects from probit regressions on the likelihood of watching
the informational video about cows’ living conditions. The variable willingness to pay to avoid
information is measured by the price of information avoidance at the point at which the individual
switches from demanding information to avoiding information. Norm-Avoid and Norm-Seek treat-
ment are treatment dummies for the corresponding treatment in Experiment 2. Robust clustered
standard errors shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
the video. While the effect is comparatively small and is exploratory, this suggests
that social norm interventions should carefully measure short-run as well as long-run
impacts, to fully capture potential spillovers onto other behaviors.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the elasticity of preferences for and against morally relevant
information. We propose a parsimonious model in which individuals suffer moral
costs from rejecting a certain moral outcome, which can explain why rather selfish
individuals prefer moral ignorance.
Using morally neutral benchmarks, we identify the differences between morally
neutral and morally relevant information avoidance, and show that the moral rele-
vance of the decision leads to significantly more information avoidance. In the moral
context, small monetary incentives to seek information have significant impact on in-
formation demand. The demand curve for moral information exhibits a pronounced
kink around zero, but price sensitivity is much weaker for larger incentives.
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This indicates that removing any (small) monetary costs of information and intro-
ducing small monetary incentives for information seeking can reduce moral ignorance
roughly by 50 percent. Hence, if feasible, such an intervention could be well suited
to foster information seeking. By contrast, larger monetary incentives would have
comparatively little impact on reducing moral ignorance, and come at a much larger
cost.
In policy circles, costless interventions such as moral “nudges” are often dis-
cussed as interventions to reduce unethical behavior. Our findings with two different
framings of norms suggest that norm interventions likely perform differently when
applied to encouraging information demand, compared to encouraging ethical be-
havior. Moral nudges in the form of norm provision can indeed increase valuations
of the moral outcome. Yet, their impact on curbing moral ignorance is limited.
Possibly, norms increase the moral costs from rejecting moral outcomes and thereby
foster ignorance for some subjects.
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[1] Albrecht, Konstanze, Florentin Krämer and Nora Szech (2017). “Animal Wel-
fare and Human Ethics: A Personality Study”. CESifo Working Paper No.
6609.
[2] Andreoni, James, and Lise Vesterlund (2001). “Which is the fair sex? Gender
differences in altruism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (1), 293-312.
[3] Andreoni, James, Justin M. Rao, and Hannah Trachtman (2017). “Avoiding
the ask: a field experiment on altruism, empathy, and charitable giving”.
Journal of Political Economy, 125 (3): 625-653.
[4] American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (2016). “New
Research Finds Vast Majority of Americans Concerned about Farm Animal
Welfare, Confused by Food Labels and Willing to Pay More for Better Treat-
ment,” Press Release.
[5] Bandura, Albert (2016). Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm and
Live With Themselves. New York: Worth Publishers.
[6] Bartling, Björn, Florian Engl and Roberto A. Weber (2014). “Does Willful
Ignorance Deflect Punishment? An Experimental Study.” European Economic
32
Review 70, 512–524.
[7] Bénabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole (2011). “Identity, Morals and Taboos:
Beliefs as Assets.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(2): 805–55.
[8] Bicchieri, Cristina and Erte Xiao (2009). “Do the Right Thing: But Only if
Others Do So.” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 22 (2), 191–208.
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Below we present the instructions for the Donation treatment in Experiment 1. The
Self-5 and Self-10 treatments had the same instructions except that the $10 donation
was replaced by a $5 or $10 payment for the individual. In Experiment 2 we added
information on social norms at the end of the instructions, as indicated in brackets
below.
In this study, you make decisions involving money for you and a donation to the
Malaria Consortium in your name.
Your donation takes place via an envelope.
The envelope either contains: a $10 donation on your behalf with 50%
chance, or no donation with 50% chance
page break
In this part, you do not know what the envelope contains. You decide
whether to get $2.50, get the envelope, or reveal what the envelope contains first.
You will make 9 decisions. In each decision you have three options:
(a) Get $2.50: then, you get $2.50.
(b) Get the envelope: then, you donate what the envelope contains, which you
do not know.
(c) Reveal what the envelope contains first: then, you are shown whether
the envelope contains a $10 donation on your behalf or no donation.
After being informed of the envelope’s content, you decide either to get $2.50
or get the envelope.
In each decision, you may receive an additional amount for choosing option
(c) ’Reveal what the envelope contains first’, or you may receive an addi-
tional amount for NOT choosing option (c), that is not ’revealing what the
envelope contains first’, and choosing options (a) or (b).
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Across the 9 decisions, this additional amount you receive varies, from $2 for
revealing what the envelope contains to $0, and from $0 to $2 for NOT revealing
what the envelope contains.
You will not know which is the ’decision that counts’ until the end of the study.
Because the computer is making a random draw, any of the choices could be the
’decision that counts.’ Therefore, you should think carefully about the choice you
make in each question.
page break
Remember, the envelope either contains:
a $10 donation on your behalf with 50% chance, or
no donation with 50% chance.
In what follows you will be shown an example and will be asked to answer several
questions, before making your decisions.
page break
EXAMPLE
As an example, let us consider question 5. In this question, you receive $0 for
revealing what the envelope contains, and $0 for not revealing what the
envelope contains. The question is shown below.
5. If you get $0 for revealing and $0 for not revealing what the envelope
contains first, what do you choose?
(a) Get $2.50
(b) Get the envelope
(c) Reveal what the envelope contains
If you choose ’(a) get $2.50’, you get $2.50.
If you choose ’(b) get the envelope’, you donate $10 with 50% chance or donate
$0 with 50% chance.
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If you choose ’(c) reveal what the envelope contains’, you learn what is inside the
envelope. Two cases can then happen:




2. The envelope contains no donation. Then you choose between:
Get $2.50 or
Donate $0.
Thus, choosing (c) brings you to another choice. This choice is either
between a monetary amount for you and a donation on your behalf or
between a monetary amount for you and no donation in your name.
page break
CONTROL QUESTIONS
As an exercise, let us consider question 1.
The envelope either contains a $10 donation with 50% chance or no do-
nation with 50% chance.
In question 1, you receive $2 for revealing what the envelope contains. You
choose from these options:
(a) Get $2.50.
(b) Get the envelope.
(c) Reveal what the envelope contains (plus $2 for revealing what the envelope
contains).
Suppose you choose (a). What happens?
 I get $0
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 I get $2.50
Suppose you choose (b). What happens?
 I get $4.50
 I donate what is in the envelope.
Suppose you choose (c). What happens?
 I learn what is inside the envelope and then decide between the envelope and
$2.50. I either decide between a $10 donation on my behalf or $2.50 for me,
or I decide between a $0 donation or $2.50 for me. I also get $2 for choosing
to reveal what is in the envelope.
 I do not learn what is inside the envelope and get $0.
page break
Now you will make your decisions for this part.
In each question, the chance that the envelope contains a $10 donation is 50%. So,
the envelope’s content varies for each question according to chance.
One of your decisions may be the ’decision that counts’. So please decide carefully!
page break
[Treatment Norm-SeekInfo: NOTE: More than 70% of MTurkers who evalu-
ated the actions in this part consider it MORALLY APPROPRIATE to
choose the option ’Reveal what the envelope contains’ first.]
[Treatment Norm-AvoidInfo: NOTE: More than 70% of MTurkers who eval-
uated the actions in this part consider it MORALLY INAPPROPRIATE
to choose the option ’Get $2.5’ without revealing what the envelope con-
tains first.]
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B Elicitation of Control Measures
After the main part of the experiment, we elicited the monetary equivalent of a
certain $10 donation, by asking the individual to make eight binary choices between
the donation and payments to her that increased from $0.10 to $10. Each choice
between a private payment and the donation was presented in a separate screen, and
across screens the value of the private payment increased. Thereafter, we elicited the
monetary equivalent of a $10 donation that occurs with a 50% chance. Individuals
made again eight binary choices, each between the potential donation and a pay-
ment that increased from $0.01 to $5. These choices were elicited in the Donation
treatment in Experiment 1 and all treatments in Experiment 2.
For each individual, we calculate her monetary equivalent of a certain (uncertain)
donation as the maximum value of the payment to her that she was willing to
give up instead of the donation. As shown in Table B.1., on average, individuals’
monetary equivalent of a certain $10 donation was 1.91 (sd = 2.94), while it was
0.69 (sd = 0.89) for a 50% chance of a $10 donation in Experiment 1.
Table B.1: Control Measures and Sample Characteristics
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Donation Self-5 Self-10 NoNorm Norm-Avoid Norm-Seek
Monetary equivalent of:
(1) $10 Donation Mean 1.91 - - 2.92 3.60 3.56
SD 2.94 3.48 3.78 3.92
(2) $10 Donation/Self
payment, with p = 0.5
Mean 0.69 1.40 2.59 0.78 0.81 0.72
SD 0.82 0.76 1.83 0.88 0.97 0.89
Subject characteristics
Female Mean 45.9% 42.9% 46.7% 55.0% 51.2% 52.9%
Age Mean 36.5 37.6 35.3 36.3 35.6 38.0
High school graduate Mean 40.5% 30.6% 44.1% 36.0% 31.8% 33.2%
On Mturk 7 days a week Mean 92.5% 91.8% 90.8% 89.0% 86.1% 91.8%
In the Self 5 and Self 10 treatments of Experiment 1, we elicited the certainty
equivalent of a $5 and $10 payment that occurred with 50% chance. We asked
the individual to make eight binary choices between the uncertain payment and
41
payments to her that increase from $0.50 to $5 in the Self 5 treatment, and $1 and
$10 in the Self 10 treatment. On average, the certainty equivalent of a 50% chance
of $5 was 1.40, and that of a 50% chance of $10 was 2.59.
The second part of Table B.1. displays the characteristics of subjects who par-
ticipated in Experiment 1 and 2, including gender, age, high school graduates and
intensity of work at Amazon Mechanical Turk.
C Additional Results
C.1 Experiment 1: Informational choices
Table C.1 below presents the distribution of choices in Experiment 1. For each price
of avoidance we show the percentage of individuals who (a) avoid and choose $2.50
(“Choose $2.50”) (b) avoid and donate (“Choose envelope”) (c) Seek information
(“Open envelope”)
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Table C.1: Distribution of choices in Experiment 1
Treatment
Price of information Donation Self-5 Self-10
-$2 Choose $2.5 14.6% 7.5% 2.6%
Choose envelope 1.0% 2.0% 2.6%
Open envelope 84.4% 90.5% 94.7%
- $1 Choose $2.5 28.6% 18.4% 6.6%
Choose envelope 2.0% 2.0% 3.3%
Open envelope 69.4% 79.6% 90.1%
- $0.50 Choose $2.5 36.7% 21.8% 10.5%
Choose envelope 2.7% 4.1% 4.6%
Open envelope 60.5% 74.1% 84.9%
- $0.10 Choose $2.5 42.5% 23.1% 13.8%
Choose envelope 2.7% 5.4% 5.9%
Open envelope 54.8% 71.4% 80.3%
$0 Choose $2.5 62.6% 25.9% 15.1%
Choose envelope 6.1% 8.2% 9.9%
Open envelope 31.3% 66.0% 75.0%
$0.10 Choose $2.5 72.8% 34.0% 19.1%
Choose envelope 9.2% 6.1% 11.2%
Open envelope 18.0% 59.9% 69.7%
$0.50 Choose $2.5 77.2% 42.2% 21.7%
Choose envelope 10.2% 7.5% 13.2%
Open envelope 12.6% 50.3% 65.1%
$1 Choose $2.5 76.5% 59.9% 30.9%
Choose envelope 12.9% 9.5% 18.4%
Open envelope 10.5% 30.6% 50.7%
$2 Choose $2.5 76.5% 76.2% 42.1%
Choose envelope 17.3% 12.9% 23.7%
Open envelope 6.1% 10.9% 34.2%
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Individuals who choose to seek information learn whether the envelope actually
contains a donation. If subjects learn that the envelope is empty, they choose the
$2.50 payment to themselves in 93.5% of the cases. If subjects learn that the envelope
contains a $10 donation, between 49% and 100% choose the donation, as shown in
Table C.2. Consistent with selection of those who value the donation opportunity
highly into seeking information, the share of those who donate increases as the cost
of information avoidance decreases.
Table C.2: Behavior conditional on choosing to seek information
(a) (b)
Envelope contains $10 Donation Envelope contains nothing
Price of information % choose envelope N % choose envelope N
-$2 49.2% 126 5.7% 122
-$1 50.5% 101 1.9% 103
- $0.50 52.1% 94 4.8% 84
-$0.10 51.3% 78 2.4% 83
$0 74.5% 47 6.7% 45
$0.10 87.1% 31 4.5% 22
$0.50 96.0% 25 16.7% 12
$1 93.3% 15 6.3% 16
$2 100.0% 7 9.1% 11
Notes: This table shows the percentage of individuals choosing the envelope in two cases: (a) when
the envelope contains a $10 donation, and (b) when it is empty. In each case we also show the
number of observations.
C.2 Experiment 2: Norms elicitation
Table C.3 shows individual ratings of moral appropriateness of each action, for each
price of avoidance. Panel A focuses on the choice to avoid and choose $2.50. Panel
B focuses on the choice to avoid and donate by choosing the envelope. Panel C
focuses on the choice to seek information, by opening the envelope.
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Table C.3: Individual ratings of moral appropriateness of each action
Moral Appropriateness Category Rating
Very morally Somewhat morally Somewhat morally Very morally
inappropriate inappropriate appropriate appropriate
Price of information PANEL A. Choose $2.50
-$2 38.24 38.24 18.63 4.9
-$1 39.22 37.25 16.67 6.86
-$0.50 40.2 30.39 23.53 5.88
-$0.10 38.24 32.35 18.63 10.78
$0 36.27 30.39 24.51 8.82
$0.1 41.18 30.39 19.61 8.82
$0.5 38.24 34.31 19.61 7.84
$1 40.2 32.35 17.65 9.8
$2 43.14 31.37 17.65 7.84
Total 39.43 33.01 19.61 7.95
Price of information PANEL B. Choose envelope
-$2 0.98 3.92 54.9 40.2
-$1 0 6.86 55.88 37.25
-$0.50 0 6.86 54.9 38.24
-$0.10 2.94 5.88 50.98 40.2
$0 1.96 7.84 47.06 43.14
$0.1 0 9.8 44.12 46.08
$0.5 2.94 6.86 48.04 42.16
$1 0 7.84 50 42.16
$2 0.98 9.8 41.18 48.04
Total 1.09 7.3 49.67 41.94
Price of information PANEL C. Open envelope first
-$2 1.96 8.82 45.1 44.12
-$1 0.98 9.8 46.08 43.14
-$0.50 0.98 8.82 48.04 42.16
-$0.10 0.98 9.8 42.16 47.06
$0 1.96 5.88 47.06 45.1
$0.1 3.92 17.65 43.14 35.29
$0.5 2.94 10.78 55.88 30.39
$1 6.86 10.78 49.02 33.33
$2 7.84 12.75 45.1 34.31
Total 3.16 10.57 46.84 39.43
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C.3 Cases of Risk Aversion and Risk Lovingness
Individuals may have different risk attitudes. Intuitively, risk aversion makes the
closed envelope less attractive such that even under high monetary incentives, only
very altruistic subjects prefer the closed envelope. The following figure demonstrates
the case of u(x) =
√
x for different levels of moral discounting, β. If the moral
discounting is pronounced, even most selfish individuals prefer to leave the envelope
closed in order to avoid moral costs from rejecting the donation.







































Figure C.1: Risk aversion: u(x) =
√
x; β = 0.36, 0.66, 0.96, respectively
In contrast, the closed envelope can become quite appealing for altruists if they
are risk loving. The following figure illustrates that case.
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